Abdullah Saeed Al Habsi
Writer and researcher specializing in security, heritage, risk management, and operations rooms
The incident involving Flydubai flight FZ1073
is no longer just a security incident inside an aircraft cockpit. Instead, it raises a broader question concerning the concept of professional trust and the limits of authority within highly sensitive institutions.
On October 3, the federal attorney general announced that investigations revealed the co-pilot had initiated a terrorist operation, attacked the pilot inside the cockpit using an emergency axe, and attempted to seize the controls.
At the same time, the attorney general emphasized that the investigation is ongoing to uncover the circumstances, motives, and connections, and to complete the examination of evidence.
Here, an important point must not be overlooked: the investigation allows us to discuss vulnerabilities, but it does not allow us to invent motives or links that investigations have not proven.
When Danger Comes from Within the Circle of Trust
What is most striking about the incident is not just the tool used or the location, but a more complex reality.
The person the investigations are discussing was not trying to breach a door protected from the outside; he was already inside the space that the system had authorized him to access.
This raises a question that may need more space in the thinking of security institutions:
What do we do if the threat changes after authorization has been legitimately granted?
We have spent many years developing systems that ask: Who has the right to enter? How do we verify their identity? What level of clearance do they possess?
Yet perhaps the time has come for the following question to receive the same level of attention:
What happens after entry?
Trust Does Not Mean the Absence of Review
Egypt and the UAE are two countries where the aviation, transport, energy, and services sectors touch millions of people every day, relying on thousands of employees who hold clearances to access areas and systems that the public cannot reach.
For this reason, I believe the lesson of this incident is not limited to the cockpit.
The same question can emerge inside a control room, a station, a bank, or a vital facility:
What do we do if the behavior of someone who already holds the correct authorization changes?
I do not believe in turning an employee into a permanent suspect. An institution that operates out of fear will lose both trust and initiative.
However, an institution can distinguish between trust in a person and leaving every sensitive action unreviewed.
Some decisions need a second pair of eyes, some changes require a secure reporting channel, and certain clearances should be temporarily freezeable without that turning into a conviction.
Authority Is One Thing… Trust Is Another
I do not believe the solution lies in constant suspicion of employees.
Aviation, energy, ports, banks, and operations rooms cannot function if we treat every professional as a potential hazard.
Trust is an operational necessity.
Yet trust is one thing, and authority is another.
An individual can remain trusted while a specific sensitive action requires a second verification.
And a clearance can remain valid while new circumstances warrant the temporary restriction of a specific authority.
This is not a philosophy based on suspicion, but rather on designing systems capable of handling changing circumstances without destroying the trust upon which the institution is built.
When Prevention Fails, Response Becomes Crucial
There is another half to the story that should not be lost amid the talk of danger.
The General Civil Aviation Authority commended the bravery of the pilot, the crew, and the passengers who helped control the situation, as their swift intervention prevented graver outcomes.
To me, this is not a side observation.
It is proof that security resilience does not merely mean preventing every incident in advance; it also means people knowing how to act when prevention fails.
No matter how strong security systems are, they cannot guarantee the complete disappearance of risks, but they can minimize their impact when employees are trained to intervene and make decisions at the right moment.
Security Does Not Read Minds… It Monitors Task-Related Behavior
The continuous review of trust must also not turn into thought surveillance or the categorization of people by nationality, religion, or background.
This is not professional security.
What an institution can measure is task-related behavior, attempts to exceed authority, and changes directly related to safety, while providing a fair channel for reporting and verification.
The requirement is not to try to read what is on people’s minds, but to design the system so that a single high-consequence action does not become the hostage of one person.
Trust Needs a System to Protect It
The lesson I see as important for Egypt and the UAE is simple in its wording, yet difficult in its implementation:
We maintain trust, but we do not make it an unchallengeable authority.
A mature institution is not one that assumes danger will not come from within its sphere of authority, nor is it one that suspects everyone who works inside it. Rather, it is one that can maintain trust while simultaneously establishing mechanisms to prevent authority from turning into a vulnerability that is only discovered after a crisis occurs.
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تابع معنا تحليل قراءة الصحف اليومية مع الكاتب الصحفي Hany Sallam عبر