When the Alternative Is Also at Risk?

When discussing critical infrastructure, we are accustomed to asking: Do we have an alternative? A secondary line, a backup center, a second resource, a different route, or a system that can take over when the primary system fails. Yet events where energy facilities, ports, and transport networks face simultaneous pressures raise a much harder question: What if the alternative is exposed to the same type of risk?

Having an alternative does not automatically mean having continuity. We may have two separate paths on the map, but they rely on a single control center, a single communication network, a single power source, a single technical supplier, or a single decision-making mechanism. In that case, the system appears dual from the outside, while remaining tied on the inside to a single point of failure.

From Backup to Continuity Engineering

In my view, organizations and countries need to move from the concept of a “backup plan” to a broader concept that can be called “continuity engineering.” The idea is not to own a second copy of the original, but to know in advance what could disable both the original and the alternative together.

This requires mapping dependencies, not just assets. A facility may be physically protected, but its operation depends on communications. Communications may be protected, but they depend on power. Power may be available, but the decision to switch to the alternative route may need an entity that does not operate at the speed required by the crisis. Here, continuity becomes a matter of operations and decision-making just as much as it is a matter of engineering.

Egypt Knows the Value of Corridors

For Egypt, the matter is not theoretical. Its location makes corridors, transport, and energy elements directly linked to the economy and the flow of regional trade. Therefore, thinking about the continuity of a canal, port, or energy network should not be limited to protecting the site itself, but should extend to what the site depends on and what others depend on because of it.

The same matter is important in the UAE, where its location, logistics infrastructure, energy, and ports make the issue of continuity part of economic security. The two experiences differ in scale and geography, but they meet at a single truth: a vital corridor does not operate in isolation, but within a system of decisions, communications, transport, energy, and information.

A Simple Yet Difficult Test

Any organization can ask five questions: If the asset stops, what is the alternative? If we switch to the alternative, what does it need to work? What elements do the two share? Who holds the decision to switch? And how long does that decision actually take in reality, rather than in the written plan?

Answering these questions may reveal that the problem is not a lack of alternatives, but that they are too similar to each other.

True resilience does not show when everything works normally, but when a part of the system fails and the operational contagion does not spread to the rest of the parts. Therefore, the coming phase in protecting critical infrastructure is not just building more backups, but designing alternatives that do not fail in the same way.

With sincere appreciation,

Abdullah Saeed Al Habsi (A.S. Alhebsi)
Writer and researcher specializing in security, heritage, risk management, and operations rooms

Published by Hany Sallam

Hany Sallam, Founder and Editor-in-Chief of Scientific Magazine Ahram
An independent Arabic science magazine operating since 2008, dedicated to simplifying science, technology, space, natural phenomena and scientific stories for Arabic readers. The magazine includes sections such as “Zodiac Group” and “Stories and Tales”, alongside science topics that combine knowledge with a spirit of discovery. It operates independently and is not affiliated with Al-Ahram Press Foundation or any governmental body.